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By Abdul Azim Islahi
 
The economics of information is one of the recent developments in the area of economic 
theory. Its use in the field of Islamic banking and finance is widely discussed. But there is still 
a lack of empirical studies. The authors should undoubtedly be commended for producing a 
thought-provoking chapter on the subject. They have presented empirical evidence from the 
experience of the Agricultural Bank of Iran (ABI) showing that a reduction in information 
asymmetry and increased monitoring by the ABI led to  the preference of variable  return 
instruments (VRIs) such as musharakah, mudarabah over the fixed return instruments (FRIs), 
like  murabahah, ijarah, bay' al-salam,  and so on. According to the authors, with increased 
supervision  and  monitoring,  information  asymmetry  is  minimized  and  under  such 
circumstances it is not efficient for the financial intermediary to lend on the basis of debt. The 
extra  cost  of  information  generation,  supervision  and  monitoring  is  to  be  considered  an 
investment,  which  entails  selection  of  superior  projects  and  an  efficient  allocation  of 
resources.  The  theoretical  part  of  the  chapter  should  not  detain  us  long,  as  considerable 
discussion has already taken place on this issue and a good deal of literature has come out on 
financial intermediation and asymmetrical information. The importance of the chapter lies in 
its empirical evidence. The authors seem to accept and strive to verify the thesis that banks 
prefer fixed return instruments (FRIs) because they minimize the information requirement of 
a financial contract when the performance of the project is not observable by the financial 
institution, and that reduction of information asymmetry is a prerequisite for implementation 
of  an  equity-based  system  (or  variable  return  instruments,  VRIs).  But  this  assertion  is 
contested by the classical example of the used-car market. Informational asymmetry in the 
used-car market, being a one-time relation between the buyer and seller, is much more prone 
to moral hazard than an equity contract.  But the fact that the market for used cars exists 
should be enough to prove that mere informational asymmetry could not be an obstacle in the 
way of equity-based contracts. It may be noted that the seller of a used car is absolved of any 
obligation if any defect is found in the car after the sale, whereas the bank's client will be held 
responsible if it is discovered that the loss is his fault.
 
Coming  to  the  empirical  part  of  the  chapter,  the  authors  argue  that  the  ABI  achieved 
symmetric information through investment in supervision and monitoring and expenditure on 
research  and  development.  Due  to  overcoming  the  problem  of  moral  hazard  through 
information-sharing and monitoring,  the share of  equity participation  (musharakah)  in  its 
portfolio  increased substantially.  They have attributed this  to  the decrease in  the average 
number of steps and time that the ABI takes to conclude a contract, a relative increase in the 
share of musharakah over time, and to the composition of outstanding facilities extended to 
the  non-public-sector  by  Islamic  banks.  I  feel  that  the  data  given  are  not  sufficient  to 
substantiate the point that the authors wanted to make.
 
The  authors  have  repeatedly  emphasized  that  the  ABI's  investment  in  supervision  and 
monitoring  resulted  in  greater  benefits.  However,  it  is  not  clear  what  the  volume  of 
investment was for this purpose and as a result what benefits or returns it could derive. Had 
the authors shown the total costs in procurement of information and monitoring by ABI, and 
the  resultant  increase  in  its  revenue,  it  would  have  been  more  convincing  that  these 
information costs were not a deadweight loss to society.
 
According to the authors, the major shift in the ABI's portfolio during the last 15 years was 
towards musharakah, because of eliminating the problems of chances of moral hazard. But it 
should be noted that out of the two equity-based contracts, musharakah and mudarabah, the 
former is the least vulnerable to moral hazard as in this case both partners contribute both 
capital and labour and the bank has a right to interfere. At a later stage the authors themselves 
accept that the shift in the ABI's portfolio towards an increased share of musharakah cannot 
be attributed solely to increased monitoring and supervision but also to a number of other 
factors. Had they argued that the increasing share of  mudarabah (pure equity participation) 
was due to achievement of more symmetric information, their  argument might have been 
more convincing. But the chapter is silent on any 'procedural change about  mudarabah  to 
save steps, time, and expense for the bank's partners'.
 
The  chapter  gives  the  impression  that  the  dominance  of  mark-up  and  other  fixed-return 
instruments in the early days of the ABI after implementation of the Interest Free Banking 
Law  in  1983,  and  still  in  other  commercial  banks,  has  been  due  only  to  information 
asymmetry and fear of moral hazard. But that is probably not absolutely correct. It might 
have been due to their need for liquidity. The  mudarabah  and  musharakah  market is less 
liquid unless a secondary stock market also exists. Moreover, different Islamic instruments 
have their own characteristics and advantages. FRIs such as murabahah, ijarah, and bay' al-
salam have an advantage over VRls such as mudarabah and musharakah, because the former 
can  be  utilized  for  meeting  end-use  purposes  such as  household  consumption  needs,  the 
purchase  of  durable  goods,  machinery,  tools,  equipment  and  the  like,  whereas  the  latter 
cannot.  The  authors  consider  moral  hazard  as  an  inevitable  consequence  of  asymmetric 
information. Many studies have shown that this is effective only when principals and agents 
have a one-time relation. In a permanent and perpetual contract, with a competition for scarce 
capital, it will be eliminated. Similarly, a small or one man firm may capitalize on relative  
informational advantage. But this is less likely when a firm is a legal entity. It is for the same 
reason that moral hazard problems do not prevent people from depositing their savings with 
Islamic banks on a purely equity basis. It will be advisable to check whether there is any 
advantage from changing the condition of borrowers from small to big or from a one-time 
relation to a repetitive contractual relation in the changing capital structure of the ABI.
 
Another  important  factor  that  may eliminate  the  occurrence  of  moral  hazard  in  spite  of 
asymmetrical  information  is  the  prevalence  of  ethical  values  and moral  commitments.  If 
Islamic morality is fostered, the standard of expected behaviour will improve, covenants in 
the written contracts  will  be honoured, business records will  be accurate,  and monitoring 
costs will  eventually fall.  Thus, developments of equity contracts  in the ABI may not be 
wholly due to investment in control and supervision.  It may be, to a great extent,  due to 
prevalence of ethical atmosphere.
 
If we allow for an honest world, the moral hazard problem, which introduces the deadweight 
cost in the variable return instruments, may be eliminated. The fact that ethical and moral 
changes in the society led to the increasing participation by the ABI is clear from the authors' 
own statement that even after destruction of all  records in the Iraq-Iran War,  the farmers 
themselves provided such records and 'all willingly submitted a copy of their own contracts to 
the bank ... from which their debt could be worked out and collected'.
 
The authors' claim that, along with investment in supervision and monitoring, the ABI also 
maintained  a  balanced  and  well-diversified  portfolio  encompassing  a  wide  range  of 
instruments.  But  Table  7.2  shows  that  more  than  two-thirds  of  capital  was  invested  in 
musharakah and mudarabah. This cannot be considered to be a balanced portfolio. The other 
Islamic banks invested in ten types of instruments while the ABI was confined to seven. 
Interestingly,  the  instruments  of  muzara`ah  (sharecropping),  and  musaqah  (fruit  sharing), 
especially for the agriculture sector, do not figure in the ABI's portfolio at all.
